INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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- 1. At the time of Andrey Ya. Vyshinskiy's speech in the U. N., made at the end of September 1954, in which he appeared to agree with the general disarmament principles expounded by the United States, Nikita S. Khrushchev delivered a bellicose speech in Peiping in which he pledged Soviet support to Chinese Communist attempts to gain possession of Formosa. This was by no means a coincidence, but a part of a coordinated plan of political action followed by the Soviets.
- 2. It must be realized that the Soviets consider it to be of utmost importance, first, to convince Chinese Communist leaders that the Sino-Soviet alliance is a permanent relationship and that China can rely on its Soviet ally to support its legitimate aspirations and, secondly, not to allow the Chinese Communist expansionist ardor to cool, since the continued turmoil in South East Asia, if not in one area, then in another, is envisioned by the Soviets as being an inalienable part of their philosophy. In pursuing the latter aim, the Soviets are encouraging Communist China to push vigorously its claims to all of Chinese territory and to a place in the United Nations. At the same time the Soviets realize that Communist China does not have the capability to engage in a major war and that Mao Tse-tung is averse to becoming so involved. Thus a speech such as the one made by Wishinskiy serves the purpose of further showing to Communist China that the Soviets do not intend to allow the international situation to deteriorate to a point where a general war becomes likely. At the same time, by a proffer of a peaceful settlement, it inhibits the West from taking a joint warlike action in the Formosa question.

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- 3. The Soviets realize that the Free World is committed to the thesis that Formosa is Chinese territory. Thus, they maintain that the like or dislike of Communist China by other powers does not change this basic premise. This being the case, it is possible that the Soviets would be quite willing to conclude, for a period, a general settlement agreement with the United States, with the understanding that the China-Formosa problem is to be resolved by MRC Tse-tung and CHAING Kai-shek themselves, without Soviet or US intervention. It is also possible that such an understanding will not be pressed for in those terms, but that the Soviets may feel that, once a peaceful settlement with the United States has been reached, they may then start pressing for a China-Formosa settlement as described above.
- 4. It is probable that the Soviets do not really expect the United States to agree to a settlement on the above terms. However, should Mac Tse-tung subsequently attack Formosa, which after all is Chinese territory, the political climate then obtaining will be such that the United States will find it difficult to obtain support from its allies for an armed intervention and, should the United States intervene militarily in the defense of Formosa anyway, then the Soviet Union will brand the United States an aggressor.

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